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Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.: The Neutral
Reportage Privilege and Robust,
Wide Open Debate
In the Spirit of Crazy Horse1 is dedicated to "all who honor
and defend those who still seek to live in the wisdom of [the]
Indian way."2 True to the book's dedication, author Peter Mat-
thiessen strives to tell the Native American side of the rise of
the American Indian Movement (AIM),3 its occupation of
Wounded Knee in the early 1970's, and a stlootout at Pine
Ridge Reservation, South Dakota, that left two FBI agents
dead.4 In so doing, however, Matthiessen upset FBI agent
David Price, who was assigned to the reservation during the
shootout and occupation and investigated both incidents.5 Price
claimed that Matthiessen's account of his role in the incidents
was defamatory, alleging in particular that Matthiessen re-
peated libelous statements accusing him of misconduct in the
investigation of the FBI agents' deaths, in the prosecution of
their suspected killers, and in the investigation of an AIM ac-
tivist's death.6 Consequently, Price brought libel actions
against Matthiessen and publisher Viking Penguin.7 The sub-
1. P. MATkHawm, IN THE SPIR OF CRAzy HoRsE (1983).
2. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1436 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
dened, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
3. The American Indian Movement (AIM) began in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota in 1968. R. WEYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND 3540 (1982). "AIM was an in-
digenous, land-based spiritual movement, a call to Indian people to return to
their sacred traditions and, at the same time, to stand firm against the tide of
what they call European influence and dominance." I& at 36. Within several
years of its founding, this militant movement became active throughout the
United States and Canada and a target of investigations by governmental au-
thorities. Id. at 36-37. AIM increased its prominence when, in 1973, several
hundred members took over the South Dakota village of Wounded Knee with
the support of many of the residents. Id. at 76-77. This crisis ended when two
FBI agents were executed by members of the movement. Id- The uprising
and resulting violence became the subject of Peter Matthiessen's book, In the
Spirit of Crazy Hore.
4. See Viking Penguin, 881 F.?2 at 1429,1434.
5. Id. at 1429.
6. Id. See infra notes 110, 128 and accompanying text (describing Math-
iessen's book and the statements at issue).
7. Price originally claimed defamation, intentional infliction of emotional
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stance of the litigation resulted in Price v. Viking Penguin,
Inc., in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to defendants Matthiessen and Vi-
king Penguin."
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit became only the
second federal court of appeals to adopt the first amendment
protection afforded by the neutral reportage privilege.9 The
privilege has various permutations, all of which allow a repub-
lisher10 to publish with impunity statements made by a person
or entity.n The republisher may republish such statements
only when the public's interest in the statements outweighs the
reputational interests of the statements' target. 2 To justify the
privilege, commentators have advanced the public's interest in
distress, false light invasion of privacy, and prima facie tort. IM at 1429. He
sought compensatory damages of $25,000,000, punitive damages, costs, and fees.
Id The district court, in successive rulings, narrowed the claims to specific
defamation claims. I&i; see also id n.1 (listing the district court's decisions re-
lating to Price's claims). These district court rulings also are reported. See
Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (D. MAinn. 1987) (dismissing
state law claim against defendant Ellison on ground of res judicata); Price v.
Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 64-51 (D. Minn. 1985) (dismissing claims
asserted under state law against Viking Penguin and Mlatthiessen); see also
Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 43 (D. Minn. 1987) (discovery orders);
Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 40 (D. Minn. 1987) (same); Price v. Vi-
king Press, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 585 (D. Minn. 1986) (same).
Price originally brought the actions against author Peter Matthiessen,
publisher Viking Penguin, Inc., and Bruce Ellison, an alleged source for the
books. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1501, 1502-03 (D. Minn.
1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
The claims against Elison were dismissed in an earlier proceeding on the basis
of res judicata. Id, at 1504 (citing Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 654 F. Supp.
1038 (D. Minn. 1987)). Ellison's counterclaims against Price, however, re-
mained in the case. Id. (Ellson alleged prima facie tort, abuse of process, con-
spiracy to interfere with civil rights, as well as constitutional violations). In
addition, Ellison litigated an action against Price in South Dakota state court.
676 F. Supp. at 1504. This Comment focuses only on Price's actions for defa-
mation against Matthiessen and Viking Penguin, Inc.
8. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426,1429 (8th Cir. 1989), cfftg
676 F. Supp. 1501, 1515 (D. Minn. 1988), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
9. Id. at 1434. The Second Circuit also recognizes the protection afforded
by the neutral reportage privilege. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
10. As used in this Comment, the terms "'publisher" and "reporter" refer
to any person or institution that publishes, or causes to be published, their
own statements. The term "republisher" refers to any person or institution
that publishes, or causes to be published, the statements of another person or
institution. The typical republisher is the media.
11. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
12. See iifra note 103 and accompanying text; see also inja note 27 (set-
ting forth justification for common law privileges for publishers).
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receiving information.1 3
The Eighth Circuit, however, expanded the neutral report-
age privilege beyond its usual confines to protect any state-
ments that criticize the conduct of a public official.14 In doing
so, the Viking Penguin court relied on the robust, wide open
debate theory that undergirded New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.'s When both the robust, wide open debate theory and the
informational theory' 6 shape the neutral reportage privilege,
the privilege provides the republisher reporting a matter of
public concern much greater protection from liability for
libel.17
This Comment sets forth guidelines for a neutral reportage
privilege that incorporates both the robust, wide open debate
theory and the informational theory. Part I examines the pro-
tection afforded publishers by the common law,'8 by the
Supreme Court's constitutional libel law,' 9 and by the neutral
reportage privilege.20 Part H analyzes the Viking Penguin de-
cision.2 ' Part IH examines the theory implicit in the Viking
Penguin decision 22 and proposes guidelines for a neutral re-
portage privilege shaped by that theory.2a Such a privilege pro-
tects the republisher whenever the republication relates to a
matter of public concern. This Comment concludes that the
theory undergirding the Viking Penguin decision calls for a
privilege that will provide the republisher stronger first amend-
ment protection than the current versions of the neutral re-
portage privilege.
13. See ifra note 100 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 146, 149-60 and accompanying text.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times the Supreme Court advanced
the actual malice standard, which protects publishers that inadvertently pub-
lish defamatory falsehoods about a public official. See infra notes 62-66 and
accompanying text (setting forth the need for robust, wide open debate of pub-
lic issues in New York Times); see also inftra notes 149-61 and accompanying
text (examining theory implicit in the Viking Penguin court's use of the neu-
tral reportage privilege).
16. The informational theory traditionally undergirds the neutral report-
age privilege. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I. A.
19. See ifra Part I. B.
20. See infra Part I. D.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part Ifl. A.
23. See infra Part III. B.
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I. PROTECTION OF PUBLISHERS
A. COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES
At common law, a publisher of a defamatory falsehood in-
curs strict liability, 4 To alleviate the harsh rule of strict liabil-
ity, courts have developed a complicated system of privileges.2
The privileges protect a publisher when relief from mistakes
encourages the free flow of information and ideas.26 Each time
courts find that a privilege applies, courts in effect have deter-
mined that the flow of information and ideas outweighs the
reputational interest of the person defamed.27
Traditionally, courts have recognized two types of privi-
leges: absoluteze and conditional.29 Two of the conditional priv-
24. R. SMOL.A, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.03[1] (1986). But see W. KEETON,
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 113, at 803
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON] (noting that when publication was
neither intentional nor negligent, courts would not impose liability). Truth is
a complete defense to a civil action for libel. W. KEETON, supra, § 116, at 840;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)]. But see R. SMOLLA, supra, § 5.01[2] (about a dozen states modified
the common law to limit truth as a defense).
25. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 24, §§ 114-115 (describing the
common law privileges); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, §§ 583-612
(same).
26. W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 114, at 815; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B introductory note; R. SMOLLA, supra note
24, § 8.01[1].
27. W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 114, at 815; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.01[1]. Courts
will also privilege communications when the communicator's interests out-
weigh the reputational interests of the person defamed by the communication.
W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 114, at 815; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.01[1]. For example,
when a radio station is required by law to allow a political candidate to air a
speech, the radio is absolutely privileged to republish the speech. W. KEETON,
supra note 24, § 114, at 824 (citing Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY,
Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959)); see R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.06[2]; RESTATE-
mENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 592AK
28. Absolute privileges afford the actor complete protection, without re-
gard to purpose, motive, or reasonableness. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B introductory note; see W. KEETON, supra note 24,
§ 114, at 815-16. Although absolute privileges are not in fact privileges, but im-
munities, courts always have characterized them as privileges. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B introductory note. Absolute
privileges reflect the belief that certain persons, because of their role in soci-
ety, must be free to act without fear of incurring liability for their statements.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B introductory note;
see W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 114, at 815-16. Absolute privileges protect
these people in a limited number of situations, all of which demand complete
freedom of expression. W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 114, at 816. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts accords the following actors an absolute privilege to
[Vol. 75:157
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ileges, the fair report privilege3 ' and the fair comment
privilege, have shaped the constitutional privilege of neutral
reportage.
1. Fair Report
The fair report privilege allows a publisher to republuh
defamatory statements on certain occasions, even if the pub-
publish defamatory statements when acting in their official role: judicial of-
ficers (Q 585), attorneys at law (Q 586), parties to judicial proceedings (§ 587),
witnesses in judicial proceedings (§ 588), jurors (§ 589), legislators (0 590), wit-
nesses in legislative proceedings (Q 590A), executive and administrative of-
ficers (Q 591), and husband and wife (§ 592) ("[a] husband or wife is absolutely
privileged to publish to the other spouse defamatory matter concerning a third
person"). RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, §§ 585-592.
29. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 24, §§ 114-115 (describing the
common law privileges); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, §§ 583-612
(same). Conditional privileges are also called qualified privileges. See W. KEE-
TON, supra note 24, § 115. This Comment will refer to them as conditional
privileges.
Conditional privileges are triggered by certain occasions. See W. KEETON,
supra note 24, § 115, at 824-25; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, ch. 25,
topic 2, tit. B introductory note. In these situations the privileges accord some
margin for error to further the actor's own interests, the interests of a third
party, or the interests of the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24,
ch. 25, topic 2, tit. B introductory note; see W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 115, at
825. The margin for error allows the actor to provide information free from
the fear that misstatements will incur liability for defamation. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 24, ch. 25, topic 3, tit. A scope note. The following occa-
sions give rise to a conditional privilege to publish defamatory statements:
when the publisher seeks to protect its own legitimate interests, to protect the
interests of others, to protect its own interests and the interests of the recipi-
ent of the publication, to protect its family relationships, or to protect the gen-
eral public when the publication is either to one who may act in the public
interest or fair comment on a matter of public interest W. KEETON, supa
note 24, § 115; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, §§ 594-598; R. SMOLLA,
supra note 24, § 8.08; see also REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 606-610 (1938)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FsRST)] (describing fair comment privilege); Devel-
opments in the Law: Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 925-28 (1956) [herein-
after Developments in Dqjfamation] (same). This- list is certainly not
exhaustive and is subject to a multitude of permutations. Compare Morton v.
Knipe, 128 A.D. 94, 98-99, 112 N.Y.S. 451, 454 (1908) (finding information vol-
unteered to further interest of another is privileged) with Henderson v. Team-
sters Local 313, 90 Wash. 2d 666, 672-73, 585 P.2d 147, 151 (1978) (finding
volunteered information not similarly privileged). The actor may lose the
privileges' protection for a variety of reasons, among them ill will; knowledge
of falsity, reckless disregard for the truth, or negligence; excessive publication;
and irrelevancy. See W. KEErON, supra note 24, § 115, at 832-35; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 24, H9 599-605A; R. SMOi.LA, supra note 24, § 8.09.
30. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
32. The fair report privilege also is called the reporter's privilege and the
privilege of record libel. See generally infra note 33.
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lisher knows the statements are false~3 The privilege protects
the fair and accurate reporting of any statement uttered in judi-
cial, legislative, or executive proceedings.34 Most jurisdictions
33. See W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 115, at 836-38; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 24, § 611; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.10; Sowle, Defama-
tion and the First Amendment The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of
Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-87 (1979); Developments in Defama-
tion, supra note 29, at 928-29 (describing fair report privilege). Apparently,
commentators have labelled the fair report privilege a special conditional priv-
ilege because, unlike the other conditional privileges, knowledge that the pub-
lished defamatory statement is false does not forfeit the privilege. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611 comment a; W. KEETON, supra
note 24, § 115, at 838; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.1011]. The press often has
invoked the fair report privilege; it Is, however, available to anyone. W. KEE-
TON, supra note 24, § 115, at 836; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611
comment c.
Many states have codified the privilege. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-161
(1982); ARLM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653 (1982); CAL. Civ. CODE § 47 (West
1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-5-7, 51-5-9 (1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-710-11, 6-710-13,
18-4807-08 (1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-11.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:49 (West 1986); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911
(West 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765(3) (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-1-804, 45-8-212 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-43-1 (West 1987); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 74 (McKinney 1976); OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.04-05 (Page
1981); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 772 (West 1983); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.605(2)(b) (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 8-16-11 (1985); S.D. CODIFID LAws ANN. § 20-11-5 (1979); TEXAS Crv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 73.002 (Vernon 1986) (formerly § 5432); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 45-2-3, 45-2-4, 45-2-10 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-504 (1978); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.1-37.14 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.050 (1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.05(1) (West 1983); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-29-104, 1-29-105 (1977); see also
D. ELDER, THE FAiR REPORT PRIVILEGE app. at 397-409 (1988). The states'
codified versions of the privilege lack uniformity. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 47 (West 1982) (extending privilege to proceedings of a public meeting or
publications for the public benefit) with MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-804 (1985)
(limiting privilege to judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the privilege:
§ 611 Report of Official Proceeding or Public Meeting
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report
of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public
that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence
reported.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611.
34. W. KEETON, supra note 24, § 115, at 836; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 24, § 611 comment d; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.10[2]. A few
jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts extend the privilege to
public proceedings that deal with matters of public concern. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 24, § 611 comment i; D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.11; W.
KEETON, supra note 24, § 115, at 836; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.10[2][d];
Sowle, supra note 33, at 482, 526; see, ag., Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 795 (9th
Cir. 1956) (holding fair report privilege protects report of public meeting called
to induce judge to call grand jury); Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d 797,
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strip the republisher of the privilege's protection if it publishes
the defamatory falsehoods with an improper motive38
Commentators have pointed to three theories to justify the
fair report privilege.38 The first is the agency theory, 7 which
rests on the notion that the republisher should attend public
proceedings as an agent of the public and should report those
802 (4th Cir. 1956) (holding newspaper privileged to report comments by presi-
dential candidate); Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 301, 313 (1856) (arguing
fair report privilege must be extended to protect reports of 'municipal, paro-
chial and other public corportions, .... [and] large voluntary associations").
But see, e-g., Venn v. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47, 56 (M.D.
Tenn. 1962) (finding that fair report privilege does not protect a quote from a
campaign speech which was used in conjunction with editorial statements),
off'd, 313 F.2d 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
Courts also require that the report he fair and accurate. This requirement
demands that the republisher report the proceedings in an impartial manner,
without misrepresenting the proceedings or misleading the reader. See RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611 comment f; R. SMOLLA, supra note
24, § 8.10[3]; Sowle, supra note 33, at 483. Because the republisher must con-
dense most proceedings, courts have interpreted the accuracy requirement to
call for substantial accuracy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611
comment f; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.1013][b]; Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7
Gray) 301, 315 (1856). A one-sided report will incur liability, as will a report in
which the republisher implies that it agrees with the defamatory statements
or makes charges of its own. See a. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 8.1013][a]; Rn-
STATEMENT (SEcOND), supr" note 24, § 611 comment f.
35. Sowle, supra note 33, at 541; see W. KEnTON, supra note 24, § 115, at
838; Develpments in Defamation, supra note 29, at 929-30; eg., Pulvermann,
228 F.2d at 802; Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 412, 61 S.E.2d 221,
225 (1950); Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, Inc., 351 Pa. 634, 645,41 A 2d 736,
742, cert denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); see, eg., Medico v. Time; Inc., 643 F.2d
134, 138 (3d Cir.) (stating that if the plaintiff shows that the republisher acted
for sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff, she defeats the fair report privilege),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts and a few jurisdictions protect the re-
publisher without regard to motive. W. KEnTON, supra note 24, § 115, at 838
(commenting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that
improper motive or purpose does not forfeit the fair report privilege, even if
the republisher believes that the defamatory statement is false); qf RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 611 comment b (stating that if the report is
fair and accurate, it is privileged); cf. id comment f (interpreting fairness re-
quirement to only encompass misrepresentations or misleading statements
without mentioning the role of the republisher's motive); see, ag., Read v.
News-Journal Co., 474 A.2d 119,121 (Del. 1984) (stating that the motive of the
republisher is irrelevant).
36. See generally D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3-4 (setting forth the
agency, supervision, and informational theories); Sowle, supra note 33, at 483-
87 (same); Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1102,
1103-17 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Republish Privilege] (same).
37. D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3; Sowle, supra note 33, at 483-84;
Note, Republish Privilege, supra note 36, at 116-17.
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proceedings in the public's absence.3s
The supervision theory,s9 in contrast, stresses the right and
the duty of the public to supervise official conduct and policy.4°
Public supervision encourages public officials to perform their
duties scrupulously.4 ' The republisher's reports of official pro-
ceedings provide the public with the information necessary to
exercise this right and fulfill its duty.42
Finally, the informational theory43 stresses the public's
general need to have information that concerns raging public
controversies.44 It allows the republisher to provide such infor-
mation in the hope that an informed public will participate in
those controversies and thus contribute to the public good.L4
2. Fair Comment
The fair comment privilege46 protects thd publisher who
38. D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3; Sowle, supra note 33, at 483;
Note, Republish Privilege, supra note 36, at 1116. In this sense, the repub-
lisher acts as the public's agent, for it attends and reports in the public's stead.
39. D. ELER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3-4; Sowle, supra note 33, at 484-87;
Note, Republish Privilege, supra note 36, at 3103-11.
40. D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3-4; Sowle, supra note 33, at 484-86;
Note, Republish Privilege, supra note 36, at 1103-04. Justice Holmes, while sit-
ting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated the classic formu-
lation of the theory.
Mhe privilege and the access of the public to the courts stand in rea-
son upon common ground. It is desirable that the trial of causes
should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies
of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of
the highest moment that those who administer justice should always
act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen
should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in
which a public duty is performed.
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (citation omitted).
41. D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3-4.
42. See D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 3-4; Sowle, supra note 33, at
485-86; Note, Republish Privilege, supra note 36, at 1103-04.
43. D. ELDER, supra note 33, § 1.00, at 4; Sowle, supra note 33, at 531-33;
Note, Republish Privilege, supr note 36, at 1111-16.
44. Sowle, supra note 33, at 531-32.
45. See i&
46. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 29, § 606 comment a; REsATF-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 24, § 566 comment a; W. KEETON, supra note 24,
§ 115, at 831-32. One court summarizes the breadth of the privilege's
application:
Traditionally, fair comment concerned persons, institutions or groups
who voluntarily injected themselves into the public scene or affected
the community's welfare, such as public officials, political candidates,
community leaders from the private sector or private enterprises
which affected public welfare, persons taking a public position on a
FIRST AMENDIENT
expresses a defamatory opinion on a matter of public concern.4 7
To invoke the privilege, the publisher must base the opinion on
true facts.48 Some courts, however, allow the publisher to in-
voke the privilege when the publisher bases the opinion onmis-
statements of fact, provided the opinion is published without ill
will, knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard of falsity.49
matter of public concern, and those who offered their creation for
public approval such as artists, performers and athletes.
Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 882 (La. 1977).
47. W. KETION, supra note 24, § 115, at 831; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 24, § 566 comment a; RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 29, § 606
comment a; R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 6.02[1]. The Restatement (Firt) of
Torts defines the privilege:
(1) Criticism of so much of another's activities as are matters of pub-
lic concern is privileged if the criticism, although defamatory, (a)
is upon, (i) a true or privileged statement of fact, or (ii) upon facts
otherwise known or available to the recipient as a member of the
public, and (b) represents the actual opinion of the critic, and (c)
is not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the other.
(2) Criticism of the private conduct or character of another who is en-
gaged in activities of public concern, in so far as his private con-
duct or character affects his public conduct, is privileged, if the
criticism, although defamatory, complies with the requirements of
Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Subsection (1) and, in addition, is one
which a man of reasonable intelligence and judgment might
make.
RESTATEMENT (FroST), supra note 29, § 606. The Restatement (Second) as-
sumes that the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the fair comment privi-
lege in a line of cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and thus omits the sections that set forth the fair comment privi-
lege in the Restatement (First). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supru note 24,
§ 566 comment c. Like the fair report privilege, anyone may claim the protec-
tion of the fair comment privilege. Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App.
Div. 535, 548, 235 N.Y.S. 340, 355 (1929).
48. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 6.021]; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST),
supra note 29, § 606 comment B (the publisher's opinion may be "reasonable"
or unreasonable, but also must be based on true facts).
49. E.g., Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 307, 27 SX.2d
837, 844 (1943); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 227, 203 N.W.
974, 975 (1925); Coleman v. Macennan, 78 Kan. 711,741, 98 P. 281, 292 (1908).
Many courts refused to allow the publisher the protection of the fair comment
privilege if the publisher based its comments on defamatory misstatements of
fact. E.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539-40 (6th Cir. 1893); A S.
Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 273-74,176 A.2d 340, 343 (1961); Foley v. Press
Publishing Co., 226 A.D.'535, 547, 235 N.Y.S. 340, 354 (1929). See generally An-
notation, Doctrine of P7ivilege or Fair Comment as Applicable to Misstate-
ments of Fact in Publication (or Oral Communication) Relating to Public
Officer or Candidatefor Office, 110 A.LIL 412 (1937) (examining minority and
majority position). Those courts that follow the minority rule generally re-
serve its broader protection for commentary on public officials and political
candidates. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 6.02[3]. The minority position tested
on the theory that publishers needed some margin for error if they were to
avoid unhealthy self-censorship. Cf. Friedell, 163 Minn. at 231, 203 N.W. at 975
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Although the opinion need not be reasonable, 6 it must have
some relation to the facts on which the publisher bases the
opinion.51 Courts withhold the privilege's protection when the
publisher issues its opinion with ill will or does not sincerely
hold the opinion.52
Vhereas the fair report privilege protects the public's right
to be informed, the fair comment privilege protects the public's
right to participate in public debate. 6 Public debate furthers
the political processes and fosters the public good,-4 for it pro-
vides a medium through which the public can exercise its rights
as citizens.-5 To this end, .the fair comment privilege allows
criticism of matters of public concern and encourages public
debate.
At common law, however, courts stopped short of provid-
ing the protection now demanded by modern times. Except in
a few jurisdictions,56 a publisher that inadvertently published a
defamatory falsehood when it reported a matter of public con-
cern exposed itself to liability for defamation.57 Fear of such li-
ability compelled publishers to err on the side of suppressing
newsworthy stories.5 8 To eliminate this self-censorship, the
United States Supreme Court entered the defamation field in
1964.59 The landmark case it heard was New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,60 in which the Court handed down the "actual mal-
(arguing "[i]f the liberty of the press must be exercised under a responsibility
that is always threatening, it will never be used for the public good").
50. RSTATEmENT (FrST), supra note 29, § 606 comment c; REsTATEmENT
(SECOND), supra note 24, § 568 comment a; RE. SMoLLA, supra note 24, § 6.021].
51. RESTATEMENT (FmsT), supra note 29, § 606 comment c R. SMOLLA,
supra note 24, § 6.02[3].
52. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 29, § 606 comment d; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 24, § 566 comment a; R. StOLLA, supra note 24, § 6.0211].
53. Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: Right to Print
Known Fasehoods, 1979 U. ILL L.F. 943, 953 [hereinafter Comment, Right to
Print Falsehoods].
54. Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 317
U.S. 678 (1942); Coleman v. Macennan, 78 Kam 711,724, 98 P. 281,286 (1908).
55. See Coleman, 78 Kan. at 719, 98 P. at 284.
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964).
59. I at 279-80. Before New York Times the Court accorded publishers
no first amendment protection. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (arguing that libelous ideas "are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality").
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan arose when the
"Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in
the South" (Committee) took out a full page advertisement in the New York
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ice" standard of first amendment protection for publishers of
defamatory falsehoods.61
Times. I& at 256-57. In the advertisement the Committee accused state au-
thorities in Montgomery, Alabama, of harassing students who were demon-
strating to protest the treatment of blacks in Alabama. See i d at 257-58. L. B.
Sullivan, the Montgomery Police Commissioner, concluded that even though
he was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, the statements implied
that he was responsible personally for the harassment Id. at 258. Conse-
quently, Sullivan filed a libel suit in the Alabama courts against four members
of the Committee and the New York Times. Id. at 256. The case came to the
Supreme Court on appeal from the Alabama Supreme Court, which had up-
held a circuit court decision for Sullivan. Id.
61. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court set forth the standard:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.
This Comment will refer to the Court's standard as either the "actual
malice standard" or the "New York Times standard."
The cases since New York Times generally fall into two categories: cases
that develop the "reckless disregard" element of the New York Times stan-
dard, ag., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964), and cases that apply the standard to different
classes of persons, ag., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, In, 403 U.S. 29, 44-45
(1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 76, 84-88 (1966). More recently, the Court has examined the
correct standard of review and its proper scope. E.g., Harte-Hanks Communi-
cations, Inm v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (1989) (holding that appel-
late courts must apply the evidentlary standard of clear and convincing proof
independently to review findings of actual malice); Anderson v. Laberty
Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (holding that the evidentiary standard of
clear and convincing proof applied to the issue of actual malice in a motion for
summary judgment and to the review of the lower court's grant of the mo-
tion); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984)
(holding that appellate judges must independently review the record to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff established adtul malice).
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the "ekless disregard" ele-
ment is a subjective element. See, eg., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74 (1964). The element embodies
not a rigid but an evolving concept. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 502-03. The
Court decides case-by-case whether a publisher acted with reckless disregard.
Id. at 503. The Court focuses on whether the publisher entertains serious
doubts as to the defamatory statement's veracity. St Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
In SL Amant, the Court stated the test- '"There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication." Id. In Garrison, the Court stated that "only
those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their prob-
able falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions:' Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74. For an excellent discussion of
the standards development up to 1974, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 334-36 n.6 (1974).
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B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The New York Times Court advanced a standard that pro-
tects publishers who inadvertently publish defamatory false-
hoods about a public official.62 In effect, the Court in New York
Times granted constitutional dimension to the minority com-
mon law position that protects fair comment even when based
on an inadvertent misstatement of fact.P
Along with granting constitutional dimension to the minor-
ity common law position, the Court adopted its theoretical
underpinnings.64 To justify protecting a publisher who inadver-
tently published defamatory falsehoods, the Court pointed out
the need for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate of
public issues.65 The Court argued that to fail to protect pub-
lishers from inadvertent falsehoods would stifle public debate
62. I See generally Kalven, The New Yotk Times Case: A Note on '"The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment" 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191 (examining
New York Times). The standard provides that a public official may recover
damages only upon showing with "convincing clarity," see New York Times,
376 U.S. at 285.86, that the publisher made the statement with "actual malice,"
id, at 279-80. The Court finds actual malice when a publisher makes a state-
ment "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. at 280. The Court has repeatedly distinguished this
definition from common law 'malice, ill will, evil motive, intention to injure,"
which does not suffice to protect first amendment values. E.g., Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75,84 (1966) (applying actual malice standard); Garrison v. Lou-
isiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (applying the same).
In later cases the Court characterized the standard as a balancing test.
E.g., Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. The test weighed the first amendment interest
in guaranteeing uninhibited public debate against the important social inter-
ests in preventing and redressing attacks on personal reputation. Id at 85-86.
When there was great need for public comment and debate, the interest in
protecting personal reputation only went so far as to protect it from attacks
falling within the embrace of the actual malice standard. Id at 86.
63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Other courts and commen-
tators have accepted this proposition. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS ch. IV, at 4.1 (1980); R. SmOLLA, supra note 24 § 6.03[1]; see, eg.,
Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 882 (La. 1977); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.
App. 514, 529-30, 343 A.2d 251, 262-63 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
64. Compare Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 740, 98 P. 281, 291
(1908) (setting forth theory underpinning minority position) woith New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 292 (setting forth theory underpinning New York Times
privilege); see also supra note 49 (setting forth theory underpinning minority
position).
65. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-71. The Court characterized this no-
tion as "a profound national comrmitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lie issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, causti% and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on gov-
ernment and public officials." I- at 270.
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and instigate self-censorship.66
Following New York Times, the Court has held that the ac-
tual malice standard applies to elected officials6 and govern-
ment employees who control government affairs.P The Court
has expanded the standard's reach to include "public figures"
as well as public officials.69 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.7° the Court broadened this base to include any person in-
volved in an event of public or general interest.' In Gertz v.
Robert Welc, Inc.,72 however, the Court retrenched, restricting
66. See i& at 271-72. The Court labeled this margin for error as the
"breathing space" that freedoms of speech needed to survive. Id. In any free
exchange of ideas, the participants would make erroneous statements. Iad The
erroneous statements deserved protection to insure that the speech continued.
Id. Because the press played a vital role in maintaining the public debate, it
was especially deserving of a "breathing space." Id. at 275 (quoting 4 ELLIoT'S
DEBATEs Ox THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTON 570 (1876)).
In other contexts, the Court labels this type of self-censorship the "chil-
ling effect." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 863 (2d ed.
1988).
67. E.g., New Yo?* Times, 376 U.S. at 292; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc-, 418
U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
68. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
69. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967). The Court
proffered two types of public figures. First, those persons whose position alone
renders them subject to public scrutiny. Id. at 155. Second, those persons who
thrust themselves "into the 'vorteae of an important public controversy." Id.
70. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
71. See id at 52. The Court premised its conclusion on the observation
that:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot sud-
denly become less so merely because a private individual is involved,
or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose
to become involved. The public's primary focus is in the event; the
public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, ef-
fect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior ano-
nymity or notoriety.
Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
In reaching its holding, the Court discounted the argument that a private
individual does not have access to the media to counter a defamatory false-
hood. Id. at 46-47. The Court noted that using the media to counter defama-
tory statements is simply ineffectual. Id. at 46.
The Court dismissed the argument that a private individual assumed no
risk of defamation as having little bearing on the first amendment guarantee
at issue. Id at 47. All individuals are "'public' men to some degree." Id at 48.
So-called "public officials" and "public figures" deserved as much protection to
their reputations as "private individuals." Id. at 48.
Finally, the Court argued that private individuals' interest in protecting
their reputation did not outweigh the need for a "breathing space." Id. at 49-
50. They could only recover upon showing that the publisher acted with actual
malice. Id. at 52.
72. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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the standard to public officials and public figures73
C. CUMULATIVE PROTECION AFFORDED PuBLISHERS
Although common law and first amendment protection
combine to provide publishers a wide range of protection when
reporting matters of public concern, gaps still exist that prevent
publishers from fully reporting such matters. For example, im-
agine that a controversy swirls around use of the pesticide
DDT. The insecticide industry defends the use of DDT while
such groups as the National Audubon Society vehemently op-
pose it. The insecticide industry calls forth prominent scientists
to defend its position.. The National Audubon Society attacks
the scientists as "paid liars." When the New York Times prints
the accusations, the scientists respond by suing the New York
Times for libel.
The common law and constitutional protection discussed
above will be of no avail to the New York Times. The newspa-
per cannot rely on the fair report privilege because the state-
ments were not uttered at a public proceeding.74 The fair
comment privilege will protect the newspaper only if a court
construes the phrase "paid liars" as a statement of opinion, not
a statement of fact 75 A few courts might apply the fair com-
ment privilege to protect the newspaper if it published the
phrase without ill will, knowledge of its falsity, and reckless
disregard of its falsity, even if the court finds the phrase "paid
liars" to be a statement of fact 7 6 The first amendment will
protect the newspaper if a court finds that the scientists are
73. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343-48 (1974). The Court
reasoned that public officials and public figures did have better means for self-
help. I at 344. Because private individuals were more vulnerable to injury, a
state could protect them. See id. Both public officials and public figures
sought public notoriety and thus assumed the risk of defamation. I. at 344-45.
Private individuals took no such action and thus relinquished none of their in-
terest in their private reputation. Id. at 345. Again, private individuals de-
serve protection. Id.
The Rosenbloom extension not only failed to protect private individuals
but also forced judges to determine what is of "general or public interest." Id.
at 346. The Court refused to leave such determinations to the judges. Id.
Consequently, the Court entrusted the states with the responsibility of
setting the defamatory standard as long as they did not impose liability with-
out fault. Id. at 347.
74. See sunv notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
76. See supmr note 49 and accompanying text. Most courts that protect in-
advertent misstatements of fact will not protect the New York Times because
the scientists are neither public officials nor political candidates. Id.
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public figures and if the scientists fail to prove actual malice.7
Thus, if the New York Times knows that the National Audubon
Society's charges are unfounded or has serious doubts regarding
their foundation, the newspaper cannot republish the accusa,
tions without exposing itself to liability for libel.
Suppose, however, the New York Times believes that the
mere fact that a responsible, prominent organization, such as
the National Audubon Society, made such outrageous, un-
founded charges is itself newsworthy and, consequently, that
the newspaper has a duty to inform the public. Alternatively,
suppose that the newspaper seriously doubts that the charges
are true yet believes that because the DDT controversy is a
matter of public concern, the newspaper has a duty to submit
the charges to the public so that the public can decide for itself.
Finally, suppose the newspaper knows the charges are false,
and even malicious, but wants to comment on this episode and
believes that its commentary will have meaning only if it repro-
duces the charges for the public. In each of the above scena-
rios, the public's interest seems to warrant the republication of
the charges. Yet to do so will incur liability. Such results re-
veal a gap in the common law and first amendment protections
for the republisher. The neutral reportage privilege is designed
to fill this gap by seizing on first amendment values to provide
the republisher first amendment protection.78
D. THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
Commentators have hailed the advent of the neutral re-
portage privilege as one of the most significant developments in
the constitutional law of libel.79 They regard such a first
amendment shield as indispensable if republishers, especially
the press, are to report the most common form of public affairs
journalism, the attacks that participants in public controversies
launch against one another80
1. Edwards v. National Audubon Society
The neutral reportage privilege has its genesis in Edwards
77. See supra notes 61-63, 67-73 and accompanying text.
78. See generally IL SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[1] (explaining the need
for the neutral reportage privilege and its role in first amendment law).
79. E.g., Hart, The Right of Neutral Reportage: Its Origin and Outlook, 56
JOURNAiLsM Q. 227,227 (1979); see, ag., I. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.1414].
80. See, ag., Hart, supra note 79, at 227; IL SMoLLA, supra note 24,
§ 4.14[l].
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v. National Audubon Society,8 ' which remains the leading case
on the privilege.82 In Edwards, the Second Circuit created the
neutral reportage privilege to protect the New York Times and
its reporter after the newspaper, facing the dilemma discussed
in Part I. C. above, printed the phrase "paid liars" and was sued
for libel.s3
The Edwards court's neutral reportage privilege allows a
republisher to report serious charges that a responsible, promi-
nent organization makes against a public figure.8 4 The court
premised the privilege on the public's intirest in being fully in-
formed about controversies.85 In the Edwards court's view, the
republisher should report some newsworthy statements at their
mere utterance.85 Serious doubts as to the truth of such state-
ments, or even knowledge of their falsity, must not suppress
their publication.8 7 The court argued that suppressing these
newsworthy statements unduly restricts public debate.88
81. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York
Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
82. See generally Comment, "The Privilege of Neutral Regortage" - Ed-
wards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 1978 UTAH L. REV. 347 (1978) [here-
inafter Comment, Edwards Priviege] (eaming Edwards).
83. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The New York Times had compiled an arti-
cle in which the National Audubon Society accused five scientists of being paid
to lie by the DDT industry. Id. at 118. In the same article, the newspaper
printed the scientists' denials. Id. The court found that the New York Times
had recited the charges accurately and neutrally, and thus, the first amend-
ment protected the newspaper. Id. at 120. The court also held that the plain-
tiffs failed to prove "actual malice." Id. Consequently, the reporter and
republisher were not liable for defamation. Id. at 121. Although the alterna-
tive holding detracts from the weight to accord the newly fermented neutral
reportage privilege, it by no means is intended to supersede it, for the Edwards
court is careful to hold that the neutral reportage privilege protects the article
at issue. See id.
84. Id. at 120. The Edwards court stated the privilege: "[WMhen a respon-
sible, prominent organization... makes serious charges against a public figure,
the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of
those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their valid-
ity." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court wrote: "What is newsworthy about such accusations is
that they were made." Id,
87. Id. The court wrote: "We do not believe that the press may be re-
quired under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements
merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press
take up cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear
of liability for defamation." Id. Thus, when a reporter believes, in good faith,
that the report conveys the charges, the privilege protects the reporter who
doubts the charges are true. See id
88. See id.
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The Edwards privilege, however, is not without limits0c"
Providing information in a neutral fashion underpins the privi-
lege.90 When neutrality is breached, the republisher loses the
privilege's protection. 1 The privilege, therefore, does not pro-
tect a republisher who espouses or concurs in the republished
charges.92 Nor does it protect a republisher who distorts the
charges to attack their subject.93
2. The Neutral Reportage Privilege Generally
Courts that have adopted the neutral reportage privilege
generally require that the republisher satisfy four conditions to
invoke its protection:.
89. Id.




94. The courts are not in accord as to the requirements. Compare, e.g., Ed-
wards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113,120 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied
sub nom. Edwards v. New York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (charges must be
made by a responsible, prominent organization) with Barry v. Time, Inc., 534
F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (ND. Cal. 1984) (charges must be made by a party to the
controversy). See also inf n note 100 and accompanying text (listing articles
that discuss the privilege), see generally R SMoLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[4](examining the courts' acceptance of the privilege).
Other federal circuit courts of appeals have not reached the issue. See
Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, Inc, 842 F.2d 825, 847 (6th Cir.
1988), cqff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989) (rejecting defendants' claim of neutral re-
portage privilege because the reporting was neither accurate nor neutral); Lee
v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting the existence of privi-
lege), cert denied sub nom. Dong-A Ilbo v. Chang Siu Lee, 109 S. Ct. 1343(1989); Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480,489 (7th Cir. 1986) (declin-
ing to reach issue because no showing of actual malice); Dixson v. Newsweek,
Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that Edwards not on point be-
cause no public figure in instant case).
In Harte Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678(1989), the Supreme Court pointed out in a footnote that, because petitioner
did not argue in its petition that the neutral reportage privilege protected its
actions, the Court would not review that part of the lower court's judgment.
Id. at 2682 nA. Justice Blackmun, concurring, pointed out that it was unwise
for petitioner to abandon the neutral reportage privilege. Id. at 2699 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). If the Court were to adopt the privilege, the instant case
may have fit within it. rd. In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54(2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit refused to apply Edwards. Id. at 69-70.
Cianci involved a magazine article about an alleged rape by a former mayor of
Providence, Rhode Island. Id. at 55-59. Without fully explaining its reasoning,
the court refused to consider the privilege. Id. at 69-70. The court indicated
that the instant case presented an inappropriate situation in which to use the
privilege. Id. at 70. The court implied that the plaintiff's interest in personal
reputation outweighed the public's interest in the information. See id. See
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1) The republished charges must relate to a public controversy, 95
2) The charges must have been made by a public official, public fig-
ure, or prominent organization;9
3) The charges must have been directed at a public figure or public
generally Comment, Restricting the First Amendment Right to RePU1,h De-
famatory Statements: Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 69 GEO. L.J. 1495
(1981) [hereinafter Comment, Cianci] (criticizing the court's decision in
Cianci).
In other cases, the Second Circuit did not fully apply the privilege. See
Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 844 F.2d 955, 961
(2d Cir.) (no need to reach issue; case decided on other grounds), cert denied,
488 U.S. 994 (1988); Reeves v. American Broadcasting Cos., 719 F.2A 602, 607
(2d Cir. 1983) (citing Edwards for the proposition that if the public is to learn
about newsworthy events, the court must grant the press relative immunity
from liability for accurate reporting of allegations).
In Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit re-
jected the neutral reportage privilege. Id. at 1226 (dictum). The court rea-
soned that the Supreme Court's ruling in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968) (see supra note 58 and accompanying text), precluded the privilege.
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225. Because Edwards accords the press a privilege to
publish defamatory statements despite serious doubts as to their veracity, Ed-
wards, 556 F.2d at 120, the court argued that it is contrary to the holding in St.
Amant, which allows recovery upon a showing that the plaintiff entertained
serious doubts. Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225 (citing St Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
In addition, the court refused to acknowledge that the reasoning in Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1971), foreshadows the neutral reportage
privilege. Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225-26. The court argued that Pape merely
stood for the proposition that a court must carefully scrutinize whether a re-
port is deliberately inaccurate. Id. at 1226. Thus, Pape does not apply to such
cases as Edwards, where the plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of the re-
port. Id-
The court also noted that the Edwards court's focus on the newsworthi-
ness of the statement is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), which rejects the Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971), "public or general interest" test.
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1226 n.5. The court pointed out that the existence of a
"newsworthy" event triggered the privilege in Edwards. Id. Relying on this
happening to trigger a privilege followed Rosenbiaom, which Gertz repudiated.
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1226 n.5. The court argued that Gertz held that the New
York Times standard focused on the status of the plaintiff, not the content of
the defamatory statement. Id. The court concludes that the neutral reporting
of a newsworthy event does not create a privilege for the press. See id, at 1226.
95. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.; see also Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp.
1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that charges must be "serious"). The
charges must be made during a public controversy or must in themselves gen-
erate a public controversy. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120 (setting forth the ration-
ale behind the privilege: "What is newsworthy about such accusations is that
they were made"). See generally R. SmoLLA, supra note 24, § 4.1413] (setting
forth elements of neutral reportage privilege).
96. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; Cianci, 639 F.2d at 67-69. But see Barry, 584
F. Supp. at 1126-27 (arguing that privilege applies to parties to the contro-
versy). See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[3] (setting forth ele-
ments of privilege).
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official;9 and
4) The reporter must neither espouse nor concur in the charges; nor
may the reporter distort them to attack the public figurePs
Commentators regard the neutral reportage privilege as a
logical extension of the fair report privilege,99 supported by the
informational theory.1' ° While the fair report privilege protects
the public's right to receive information that concerns official
proceedings,10 ' the neutral reportage privilege extends that
protection to information that concerns public controversies.
2
If the informational theory is accepted as valid, the step from
the fair report privilege to the neutral reportage privilege is
small 03
97. Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F2d 626, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1977); see Ed-
wards, 556 F2d at 120; see generally B. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[3] (set-
ting forth elements of privilege).
98. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; Cianci, 639 F.2d at 67-69; Barry, 584 F. Supp.
at 1126-27; see generally, P. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[3] (setting forth ele-
ments of privilege).
99. E.g., 1. SmLLA, supra note 24, § 8.1011]; Comment, Right to Print
Falsehoods, supra note 53, at 961-63.
100. See Comment, Constitutional Pivtege to Republish Defamation, 77
COLUL L. EV. 266, 1278 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional Pryi-
lege] (arguing that publishing defamation uttered by public official or public
figure provides information relevant to self-government); Comment, Cianci,
supm note 94, at 1508-09 (examining public's right to know in neutral report-
age context); Comment, Right to Print Falsehoods, supm note 53, at 961-62 (ar-
guing that privilege must be predicated on public's right to information
affecting its welfare); Comment, Edwards Pivilege, supra note 82, at 354-56
(arguing that press should freely disseminate information about public issues);
see also Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a Defense Against R1epublishing Libel,
ComL & L., March, 1989, at 3, 17 (concluding that informational rationale is
sufficient to allow the privilege to apply to republishing of nongovernmental
statements made by organizations or individuals involved in public contro-\
versy); Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. ,
853, 867.68 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Developing Privilege] (arguing that re-,
porter must report charges, even if false, to cover adequately any controversy);
Sowle, supra note 33, at 531-32 (1979) (arguing that informational theory pro-
vides rationale for privilege to report nongovernmental statements and pro-
ceedings); Note, Republish Privlege, supra note 36, at 111-20 (1964)
(explaining informational theory and applying it to reporting of defamations).
See generally supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (setting forth the infor-
mational theory).
101. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text
102. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[1]; Comment, Right to Print False-
hoods, supra note 53, at 962.
103. Eg., Comment, Constitutional Privilege, supra note 100, at 1278.
Given the informational theory, the need for a pre-existing public controversy
is superfluous, as is the requirement that the object of the accuser be a public
official or figure. See Note, Developing Privilege, supr note 100, at 870-72. It
is the utterance of the falsehood that is newsworthy, not its object or the con-
text within which it was said. Id Acknowledging this notion, Smolla includes
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II. PRICE V VIKING PENGUIN, INC.
Against this backdrop, the Faghth Circuit decided Price v.
Viking Penguin, Inc.L0 4 In reaching its decision, it became only
the second federal court of appeals to adopt the neutral report-
age privilege.
When Viking Penguin printed and distributed In the Spirit
of Crazy Horse,05 it spawned a controversy whose litigation
within his elements of a fair report privilege a requirement that the charges
"must either relate to a preexisting public controversy or generate a 1 ,ubic
controversy in their own right." R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.14[3] (emphasis
added).
As applied, the neutral reportage privilege provides first amendment pro-
tection on two occasions. First, the privilege provides protection when a pub-
lisher informs the public that a public official, public figure, or prominent,
responsible organization has uttered defamatory falsehoods. This event is it-
self newsworthy. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub non Edwards v. New York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
Second, the privilege provides protection when a publisher informs the public
of events at the heart of a public controversy. Such information is indispensa-
ble to an informed opinion. C. Barry v. Time, Inc, 584 F. Supp. 3110, 1126-27
(ND. Cal. 1984) (arguing that the public should be "the ultimate arbiter of the
truth of accusations made during the course of a public controversy"); see
Sowle, supra note 33, at 531-32. To this end, the press must fully report the
public controversy. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126; Sowle, supra note 33, at 531-
32.
When applying the privilege, the courts have sought to insure that the
value of the information provided the public outweighs the harm to reputation
inflicted by the accuser's defamatory falsehood. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 115, 120;
Comment, Right to Print Fasehoods, supra note 53, at 944-45, 953-54. The
courts, nevertheless, recognize that the first amendment need to inform the
public overrides the individual's interest in reputation. Edwards, 556 F.2d at
122; Sowle supra note 33, at 532.
In a leading case, Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984), a
federal court extended the scope of the privilege. The Barry court specifically
undertook to evaluate whether the neutral reportage privilege applies to defa-
mations uttered by persons who do not qualify as public officials or figures. Id
at 1125. In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court held that the privilege ap-
plies to all defamations that one participant in a public controversy utters to
another participant in that same controversy. Id at 1126. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant could not claim the protection of the neutral reportage
privilege because the defendant's source was not a "responsible, prominent
organization or [individual],' but rather a convicted felon who has failed a lie
detector test" Id at 1125. The court argued that the rationale behind Ed-
wards - "the public interest in being fully informed" - applies regardless of
the utterer's identity. I&. at 1126. Consequently, courts must allow the press
to republish the charges made by participants. Id. This republication allows
the public, not the press, to make the ultimate decision as to the credibility of
the sources and of their accusations. I&. at 1127. To this end, the court argued
that the requirement of neutrality is crucial. Id.
104. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990).
105. P. MATIFSSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE (1983).
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lasted over five years, resulting in copious and expensive dis-
covery'0 6 and generating numerous orders and opinions.:L7 The
controversy concerned statements that author Peter Matthies-
sen made or reported in In the Spi-t of Crazy Horse.lca The
non-fiction book focuses on AIM and in particular on the
events surrounding the June 26, 1975, killing of two FBI
agents.109 The statements forming the substance of the contro-
versy accuse FBI agent David Price of misconduct in the inves-
tigation of the Idllings, in the prosecution of the suspected
killers, and in the investigation of the death of an AIM ac-
tivist.10 Because of these statements, Price sued Matthiessen
106. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1501,1503 (D. Minn. 1988),"
'ff'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denie, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). The dep-
osition of author Peter Matthiessen, for example, took eight days, and the
transcript was over 1100 pages in length. I& n.5. The defendants spent over
$1,000,000 in defense of the suit. Price v. Viking Pengui I=, 881 F.2d at
1429.
107. Viking Penguin, 676 F. Supp. at 1503 iL1. The district court also notes
that the controversy produced suits in South Dakota state courts. Id. at 1504.
108. See Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1447-51 app. (containing excerpts
from David Price's complaint which constitute the statements at issue in the
case).
109. According to the Eighth Circuit, Crazy Horse is divided into three
parts. I. at 1434. First, Matthiessen surveys the conditions on the Pine Ridge
Reservation in South Dakota and traces the rise of the AIM. Ird The second
part examines the 1975 killings of two FBI agents, the investigation of the kill-
ings, and the trials of the suspected killers. Id. at 1435. The third part argues
that Leonard Peltier, whom a jury convicted of murder for the 1975 killings,
deserves a new trial because new documents expose government misconduct.
AE; see generally United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1978), cert de-
nied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (affirming Peltier's conviction of the murders);
United States v. Peltier, 800 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 822
(1987) (affirming the denial of Peltier's appeal for a new trial based on the
new documents).
110. See Viking Penguin, 676 F. Supp. at 1506. David Price was a special
agent of the FBL Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1429. The FBI assigned Price to
the Pine Ridge Reservation in the early 1970's. IcE The controversial state-
ments stemmed from the Wounded Knee occupation in 1973 and the shootout
on the reservation in 1975. Id. at 1505-06. Price considered Matthiessen's ac-
count of the occupation and shootout defamatory. Id- He sued Mlatthiessen
and Viking Penguin for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, false light invasion of privacy, and prima facie tort Id. Price sought
compensatory damages of $25,000,000, punitive damages, costs and fees. Id
After extensive litigation the district court narrowed Price's claims to def-
amation, involving twenty statements made in Crazy Horse. Id. The Eighth
Circuit divided the statements into five categories:
Price's relation to the perjury of Louis Moves Camp and involvement
in seeing that criminal charges against him were dropped; misconduct
regarding the testimony and affidavits of Myrtle Poor Bear;, the with-
holding of information or gross negligence regarding the homicide in-
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and Viking Penguin for libel.m
vestigation of Anna Mae Aquash; harassment of Indian people; and
general statements about Price's character.
I&; see generally iti app. at 1447-51 (quoting the twenty disputed statements
from Price's complaint).
Taking the categories in turn, Louis Moves Camp testified for the prosecu-
tion against AIM members charged with crimes stemming from the Wounded
Knee incident. I& at 1437. The defense proved that Moves Camp was in Cali-
fornia when some of the events at Wounded Knee that he described occurred.
Id Thus, the defense impeached Moves Camp's testimony. Id. In addition,
Matthiessen relates an incident involving Moves Camp and the investigation of
an alleged rape that resulted in police detaining Moves Camp only to release
him later. I& at 1437-38. Matthiessen connects Price to both incidents. I-
Price argues that Matthiessen accuses him of suborning Moves Camp's perjury
and covering-up Moves Camp's involvement in the rape. I at 1438; see also
id. app. at 1447-48 (paragraphs 10(a), 10(b), 10(c), and 10(d) set forth the basis
for this claim).
Myrtle Poor Bear testified against AIM leader Dick Marshall and signed
contradictory affidavits that led the United States Attorney to extradite
Peltier from Canada. r& at 144041. The United States Attorney acknowl-
edged that Poor Bear was incompetent to testify and that her affidavits were
contradictory. Id at 1440; see also i& at 1442 (quoting exchange between judge
and United States Attorney during oral argument on Peltier's appeal). Price
argues that Matthiessen suggests that he should have known Poor Bear was
incompetent to testify and that he suborned perjury in securing Poor Bear's
affidavits. Id. at 1440-42; see also id- app. at 1448-50 (paragraphs 10(d), 10(f),
10(n), 10(o), and 10(w) set forth basis for this claim).
Anna Mae Aquash, an AIM activist wanted by the FBI, was found dead
and unidentified on the reservation during the winter that followed the 1975
shootings. I& at 1443. The first autopsy attributed her death to exposure. I&
The authorities buried her as Jane Doe and sent her hands to Washington,
D.C., for identification. Id Her hands revealed her identity. Id. A second au-
topsy concluded that a bullet fired point-blank into the back of her head killed
her. Id.
Price argued that six defamatory statements relating to this incident -
read together - accuse him of murder. Id. The six statements allege that the
death was suspicious, that Price had met Aquash before and should have been
able to identify her, that rumors attributed the death to the FBI, and that
some people believed Price murdered her. Id; see also i& app. at 1448-51
(paragraphs 10(f), 10(g), 10(i), 10(k), 10(m), and 10(x) provide the basis for
Price's claims).
Two statements accuse Price of harassing Indians during his investigation.
Id. at 1445. One does so in general terms, and the other accuses Price of enter-
ing a home without a warrant. I&-; see aso i& app. at 1447, 1451 (paragraphs
10(a) and 11(g) set forth the respective statements).
Finally, statements attack Price's character. Id- at 1445. An attorney calls
Price "corrupt and vicious." I&.; see also id app. at 1450 (paragraph 10(s)).
The remaining three statements express Matthiessen's view that 'Price alters
facts to fit his pre-conceptions, that he would be soiled by his acts no matter
whether he paid any penalties, and that he exemplified dishonest govern-
ment." Id. at 1445; see also id. app. at 1450 (paragraphs 10(t), 10(u), and 10(v)
respectively).
111. I& at 1429.
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Price's claims.m In so doing, the court granted first amend-
ment protection to the allegedly defamatory statements pub-
lished in the book.'
A. THE CoNTouRs OF THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
iN PRiCE V. VnuNG PENGUIN, INC
The Eighth Circuit adopted a neutral reportage privilege
that protects the accurate recitation of statements that public
bodies utter even if the implications of the statements are
harmful.-1 4 This privilege protects reporters who honestly be-
112. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426,1446, (8th Cir. 1989), cffg
676 F. Supp. 1501 (D. M. 1986), cert deni, 110 S. Ct 759 (1990).
113. IM at 1446-47.
14. I at 1434 (citing Janklow v. Newsweek Inc., 759 Fd 644 (8th Cir.
1985) (panklaow 1), rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986) (Janklou 17),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986)). The court states "recitation of official actions
or statements by public bodies, if substantially accurate, is protected, even if
the Implications are harmful." Id- The court notes that Jankow H preserved
this proposition in a footnote. IM (citing Janklow I, 788 F.2d at 1301 n.2).
The Jandow controversy concerned an article that Newsweek magazine
wrote about William Janklow, the governor of South Dakota, and American
Indian activist Dennis Banks. Janklow H, 788 F.2d at 1301. The article told
the story of Bank's interactions with Janklow. Id- Janklow sued Newsweek
for defamation, basing his claim on one paragraph that states:
Along the way, Banks made a dangerous enemy - William Janklow.
Their feud started in 1974, when Banks brought charges against Jan-
klow in a tribal court for assault. A 15-year-old Indian girl who baby-
sat for Janklow's children had claimed that he raped her in 1969.
Federal officials found insufficient evidence to prosecute, but Banks
persuaded the Rosebud Sioux chiefs to reopen the case under tribal
law. Janklow, who was running for election as state attorney general
at the time, refused to appear for the trial. But the tribal court found
'probable cause" to believe the charges and barred Janklow from
practicing law on the reservation. Eight months later Janklow -
who had won his election despite the messy publicity - was prosecut-
ing Banks. And his case - based on the 1973 Custer riot - was suc-
cessful. Found guilty of riot and assault with intent to kill, Banksjumped ball before sentencing.
Id. at 1301, 1303.
The Jandow I court found that, because the rape allegations were in fact
made, Newsweek could report them as "a materially accurate report of histori-
cal fact," even if the implication is harmful. Janklow I, 759 F.2d at 649. Jan-
klow H preserved this analysis. Janklow , 788 F2d at 1301 n.2.
The Viking Penguin court misinterprets this language to mean not that
the republisher may print the allegations even if their impication is harmful,
but that the republisher may print all allegations even if they are defamatfalseoods. The court probably misinterpreted the language because Janklow
attacked the republishing of the rape allegation as libelous, for it implies that
he raped his accuser. The traditional method of attack would entail joining
the accuser and Newsweek (the republisher). Having done that, Janklow
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lieve their reports accurately convey the charges that were
made."1 5 The privilege, however, does not protect the reporter
who espouses or concurs in the charges," 6 or distorts them to
attack a public figure.'- 7
The Viking Penguin court observed that it "refined" the
privilege, for it would protect a reporter even if the report were
one-sided." s The court noted that evidence of the reporter's
"general disposition to his topic" does not indicate whether the
reporter in fact concurs in or espouses the particular allega-
tion."19 The court thus focused solely on whether the report ac-
curately reflects what was said or done.120
B. THE EIGHTH CIRcuI's APPLICATION OF THE NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
Although the court neatly laid out the neutral reportage
privilege in the background section of its opinion,12 ' the court's
use of the privilege is difficult to assess because it never explic-
itly applied the privilege to the facts of the case.'22 Instead, the
court weaved the elements of the privilege into its first amend-
ment analysis.2 In this analysis, the court stated that the first
amendment protects the accurate recitation of events, even if
would prove that his accuser was lying and then prove that Newsweek printed
the allegations with actual malice. Probably to avoid bad publicity and a civil
trial on the merits of the rape allegation, Janklow merely sued Newsweek, ac-
cusing it of libelously imputing rape to him. The Janklow I court found that
the printing of the allegations was not libelous because Newsweek itself did not
accuse Janklow of rape. JankoW I, 759 F.2d at 649. Absent proof that Jan-
Mlow did not in fact rape his accuser, Janklow could not hold Newsweek liable
for libel. Thus, the proposition that the Viking Penguin court cited as stand-
ing for the neutral reportage privilege only applies to situations in which the
allegation itself has been proved neither true nor false. The neutral reportage
privilege protects the accurate recitation of allegations without regard to
whether the allegation itself is true or false. See Edwards v. National Audu-
bon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Edwards v. New
York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
115. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434 (quoting Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120).
116. Id. at 1434 (quoting Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; citing Cianci v. New
Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980)).
117. Id, (quoting Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; citing Cianci, 639 F.2d 54 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
118. See id. (citing Janlow H, 788 F.2d at 1304). The court characterizes
the article at issue in Janklow It as "'transparently pro-Banks."' Id. (quoting
Janklow 11, 788 F.2d at 1304).
119. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1437-47.
123. See Viking Penguin, 881 F2d at 143940, 1445-46.
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the reporter intentionally leaves a defamatory implication.-A
Moreover, the first amendment protects a report that accu-
rately recites "accusations and counter-accusations" 1 2 made by
primary sources,12 including "personal interviews" as a pri-
mary source.' 2
The court incorporated the neutral reportage privilege into
its analysis of Matthiessen's report of rumors that surrounded
the death of Anna Mae Aquash, an AIM activist.m In this re-
2 See id. at 1439-40. The court includes this part of the concept in its
original recitation of the concept- 'We have held that the recitation of official
actions or statements by public bodies, if substantially accurate, is protected,
even if the implications are harmful." I- at 1434 (emphasis added).
The first application centers around Price's claim that Matthiessen recited
the events surrounding the alleged rape for which police detained Moves
Camp in a manner that falsely implies that Price obstructed justice. I- at
1439. The court notes that the events can be interpreted in more than one way
and that Matthiessen's version mirrors other versions. Id at 1439-40 & n0O
(citing trial transcript of United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D.
1974), at 21,749 through 21,754 (presiding Judge Nichol criticizing the FBI's
handling of Moves Camp)); R. WEYLm?, BLOOD or Tim LAND 119, 178 (1982)
(noting that Price collaborated with another agent to solicit the perjured testi-
mony of Moves Camp); Correspondence from Linda Huber of the firm of
Tigar, Buffone, and Doyle, to William Webster, Director of the FBI (June 6,
1981) (stating that David Price and others developed Moves Camp's perjured
testimony). The court labels as "crucial" that Price does not challenge the "es-
sentials" of Matthiessen's version of events. Id. at 1439-40. Citing Janklou H,
the court holds that the statements at issue are protected. Id- at 1440 (citing
Janklow , 788 F.2d at 1306).
At issue in Jankdow 1 (see generally supra note f14 (quoting excerpt from
article at issue)) was a defamatory implication that the prosecutor sought a
conviction for personal reasons. 788 F.2d at 1303. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant deliberately distorted the events to support its defamatory opinion.
Id. The court disagreed. Id. at 1304. It refused to make editorial judgments
about word choice, especially when the "sting' of the implication remained
even if the reporter fully laid out the events. I
By relying on Janklow 1, the Viking Penguin court illustrates that sub-
stantial accuracy is the only requirement needed to invoke the neutral report-
age privilege. See Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434 (stating, "[t]hus, we focus
on whether the reports were accurate reflections of what was said or done").
Although applying the neutral reportage privilege to the accurate recitation of
events adds nothing new to defamation law, the court's equating of events
with accusations suggests that the Eighth Circuit now affords absolute protec-
tion to the accurate recitation of statements.
125. See Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 144445.
126. Cf 881 F.2d. at 1445-46 (arguing that Price cannot claim actual malice
on Matthiessen's part when Price fails to contest accuracy of Matthiessen's
quotations of primary sources).
127. Ia at 1435 (listing the primary sources: "Ptimary sources included
court transcripts, court decisions, F.B.I. records, congressional investigations,
legislative resolutions, books, articles and personal interviews").
128. Id. at 1444-45. The court notes: "Rumors that talk of the F.B.I. or
white people in general but fail to mention Price are irrelevant in the absence
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port Matthiessen recited statements, made during personal in-
terviews, accusing Price either of killing Aquash' 9  or
otherwise being involved in her death.130 The court found that
such recitation was protecte&131
The court reasoned that authors must have leeway to re-
port accusations and counteraccusations when writing about
controversies.12 Although the court never mentioned the need
of a direct accusation." Ia at 1443. In the appendix to the case, the court in-
dudes the excerpts from In the Spirit of Crazy Homse that provided the basis
for Price's claim:
10(i) An A.I.M. leader interviewed that spring said, "A.I.M. didn't kill
her, the pigs got to her first They knew we knew who she was,
and they wanted to blame A.IM. with her death." This same
person thought that the F.B.I. was trying to blackmail Anna
Mae by threatening to expose her as an informer, whether she
was an informer or not. A continuing lack of FXB.I. interest in
any serious investigation of her death [parenthetical omitted]
encouraged rumors among the Indians that she had been killed
in retaliation for the agents' deaths...
Inevitably, local suspicion focused on David Price, who was
already notorious on the reservation; Price himself remarked
that he had heard that A.LM. had put a contract on his head.(Crazy Horse at 267).
10(k) A few days later, Kunstler took this matter up with Agent
Price, whom some of the Indians, at least, had suspected of in-
volvement in the killin ... (Crazy Horse at 306).
S In all likelihood, most people feel, the original suspicions about
Anna Mae were spread by Douglas Durham, who tried to dis-
credit anyone he did not control, and these rumors intensified
when David Price questioned her in March 1975; apparently
Price was working with John Stewart, who may have started
the rumors in Oglala. But despite occasional suggestions to the
contrary and lurid articles on this case, no one I have talked to
makes the serious claim that David Price killed Anna Mae
Aquash; all seem to agree that whoever was responsible for the
death, it was an Indian who pulled the trigger. It is sometimes
said that Lakota medicine men, making their own Indian-way
investigations, had received the message in the sweat lodge: an
Indian had killed Anna Mae at the direction of two white men,
and sooner or later the names of the killers would come out.
As Red Cloud remarked of Spotted Tail's death, ".... an Indian
did it. But who set on the Indian?" (Crazy Horse at 445-46).
Id- app. at 1449.
129. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1444. Complaint paragraph 10(i) suggests
that Native Americans believed that the FBI killed Aquash to retaliate for the
deaths of its agents. Id. at 1444, app. at 1449. The same paragraph states that
the Native Americans suspected Price. I
130. Id Complaint paragraph 10(k) states: "Kunstler took this matter up
with Agent Price, whom some of the Indians, at least, had suspected of in-
volvement in the k ng ... " Id at 1443, app. at 1449.
131. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1445.
132. Id- at 1444.
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to present both sides of the controversy,s it emphasized that
Matthiessen gave Price a chance to respond to the accusations
and that Price used the opportunity to accuse a Native Ameri-
can of being involved in Aquash's death.13 In addition, Mat-
thiessen included official FBI statements exonerating. Price in
the investigations of her death.1 As evidence that Matthies-
sen did not espouse either side's accusations, the. court noted
that Matthiessen "strongly" indicates his belief that Price is
innocent.s
The court also incorporated the neutral reportage privilege
when it considered whether Matthiessen republished the state-
ments with reckless disregard for their truth.-37 Although the
court mentioned that Price failed to introduce evidence indicat-
ing Matthiessen doubted any particular statement was true,-s
the court did not focus on Matthiessen's state of mind when he
republished the allegedly defamatory falsehoods, as traditional
first amendment analysis would require.s Instead, the court
focused on whether Matthiessen accurately quoted primary
sources.1 o
133. See id. at 1434.
134. Id. at 1444.
135. Cf. ii at 1444-45. Although the court does not identify the investiga-
tions, the context of the discussion and the page the court cites in Crazy Horse
(267) indicate that the court refers to the FBI's investigation of Aquash's
death. I&
136. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1445.
137. Id. at 1445-46. The court also intimates this incorporation when it dis-
cusses the two concepts in an earlier section, entitled 'eckless Disregard and
Neutral Reporting." Id. at 1433-34. The court points out that it "has added"
the concept of neutral reporting to the actual malice standard. Id. at 1434.
Whether the court means that.it has added to the standard extra protection
extrinsic to the standard or intrinsic in it is unclear. The court's subsequent
application of the two concepts to the facts indicates that it no longer finds the
actual malice standard applicable to the accurate recitation of quotations. See,
ag., id. at 1444-45 (finding that statements reporting accusations and counter-
accusations are protected).
138. Id. at 1445-46.
139. Id,
140. This approach seems to go to the threshold issue of whether the al-
leged defamatory statement is true or false. See generally R. SMoLLA, supra
note 24, § 5.00 (examining "Truth as a Constitutional Defense"). In this sense,
the neutral reportage privilege can be conceptualized "as a modern adjunct to
the truth defense." I& § 5.12. As such, the privilege allows the court to split
the threshold issue into two tiers. First, the court determines whether the ut-
lerer's statement is both false and defamatory. If so, she is liable. Second, the
court considers whether the reziublisher, typically the media, accurately re-
ported the statement. At this level of inquiry, the court does not consider the
veracity of the statement's content, as traditional defamation analysis would
require. Instead, it abandons the legal fiction that a republisher adopts the
1990]
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In effect, the court provided first amendment protection to
the accurate recitation of accusations, without regard to their
truth or falsity. The actual malice standard becomes relevant
only if the republisher fabricates or distorts the accusation.
The court then would ask whether the republisher entertained
serious doubts as to the accuracy of her report of the accusa-
tion, not whether the republisher entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the accusation itself. Consequently, the content
of the statement becomes irrelevant; its republication is abso-
lutely protected if reported accurately.
The Viking Penguin court extended the contours of the
neutral reportage privilege beyond its previous confines.' 4 By
focusing on whether the republisher accurately conveys what
was said,14 the court relegated the requirement of neutrality
solely to the presentation of particular statements.143 Thus, the
republisher may concur in or espouse the general position of
the accuser, and even passionately criticize the target of the ac-
cusation,144 yet still may invoke the privilege as long as the par-
ticular accusation is reported disinterestedly and
dispassionately.'4 The Viking Penguin court also extended
the neutral reportage privilege to statements by sources that
were neither public officials, public figures, nor responsible,
prominent organizations.1
The Viking Penguin court's extension of the neutral re-
portage privilege suggests that the theory underpinning the
privilege is not only the informational theory, on which the Ed-
wards court relied,147 but also the robust, wide open debate the-
libelous statements as its own statements and focuses on whether the state-
ments were uttered. In this sense, the statement is "true" if uttered. Id
141. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text
142. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434.
143. See ia
144. I& at 1434-37 (explaining that Matthiessen wrote Crazy Horse to pres-
ent the Native Americans' side of the story, to argue for a new trial for Leo-
nard Peltier because of government misconduct; noting that Crazy Horse is
dedicated "for all who honor and defend those people who still seek to live in
the wisdom of [the] Indian way"; noting that Matthiessen depicts Price as a
"casualty" of government policy but nevertheless "soiled for the rest of his
days by deeds done in the belief that the end justified the means...." (citing
Crazy Horse at 471-72)).
145. See id. at 1434.
146. See icd at 1434, 1444-45.
147. See supra note 85 and accompanying text see also supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text (setting forth informational theory).
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ory of New Yor7 Times. 48 In fact, the Eighth Circuit's decision
sets the stage for an even broader neutral reportage privilege
that will ensure matters of public concern will be both fully re-
ported and fully debated.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE PIVLEGE EXTENDED
The Viking Penguin court applied the neutral reportage
privilege in a manner that only incidentally increases the
amount of information available to the public; the court's real
concern was free access to the public forum. The genre in
which the Viking Penguin defamations were published, that of
investigative reporting,1 49 does not merely report a public con-
troversy: it plays an active role in the controversybsa Matthies-
sen, as the author of In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, was a
participant in that controversy.-5 ' In short, by applying the
neutral reportage privilege to Matthiessen, the court allowed
Matthiessen not only to provide the public with information
and the other side of the debate but it also allowed him to ac-
tively participate in the debate.1 52
148. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra, notes 64-66 and accompanying text (set-
ting forth robust, wide open debate theory).
149. See generaly McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383, 1391
(S TN.Y. 1981) (refusing to apply neutral reportage privilege to include 're-
ports of such journalist-induced charges").
150. CQ1 C. BERNsTm & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PREsmENT's MEN (197/4)
(investigative reporting which ignited the public debate about Watergate).
15L Matthiessen did not merely republish defamatory statements. He ac-
tively solicited those statements and did so for a purpose: to give the Native
American side of the story. 881 F.2d at 144. The result of Matthiessen's in-
quiries constitutes In the Spirit of CaZy Horse.
At least one court has found that the neutral reportage privilege does not
apply to investigative reporting. In McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp.
1383, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court rejected the plaintiff's claim in an action
similar to that beforethe Viking Penguin court. I& The court reasoned that:
Since there is no indication in the Edgardis opinion that the neutral
reportage privilege was meant to cover investigative reporting, and
since including reports of such iournalist-induced charges within the
protection of the privilege is unnecessary for promoting the purpose
of Edwards, the freer reporting of raging controversies, this Court is
constrained to find the defendant-author here unprotected by the
privilege.
152. Matthiessen states in his introductory note that his goal is to tell the
Native American side of the dispute. 881 F.2d at 1434 (citing the introductory
note of Crazy Horse). He dedicates the book "for all who honor and defend




The court focused on whether the report accurately re-
flected what was said.-ss But in the wider context, which the
court dismissed as irrelevant,5 4 an author may so distort a con-
troversy, and may be so adept at winning the reader to his side,
that a reader presented with a specific factual allegation no
longer can make a neutral, disinterested evaluation. The
reader's evaluation of the reported facts provides an important
check in the framework of the neutral reportage privilege set
forth in Edwards and its progeny. The Viking Penguin court
relegated this check to the immediate context in which the de-
famatory falsehood is republished.'- The court circumscribed
this requirement because it valued In the Spirit of Crazy Horse
not for the information the book provides the public, but for
the role it plays in public debate.156
Moreover, the informational rationale 7 does not provide a
strong basis for the neutral reportage privilege when no raging
public controversy exists. The events at issue in In the Spirit of
Crazy Horse occurred in 1973 and 1975.'5 Viking Penguin,
however, did not publish the book until 1983.' s9 The debate
that raged around the events at Wounded Knee in 1973 and the
shoot-out at the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975 must have died
down somewhat by 1983.160 What was at stake in Viking Pen-
153. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434.
154. I&
155. I.
156. See, eg., id. at 1446-47. The Viking Penguin court concludes its
opinion:
Sometimes it is difficult to write about controversial events with-
out getting into some controversy along the way. In this setting we
have decided that the Constitution requires more speeqh rather than
less. Our decision is an anomaly in a time when tort analysis increas-
ingly focuses on whether there was an injury, for in deciding this case
we have searched diligently for fault and ignored certain injury. But
there is a larger injury to be considered, the damage done to every
American when a book is pulled from a shelf, as in this case, or when
an idea is not circulated.
.oo, In its entirety, Crazy Horse focuses more on public institu-
tions and social forces than it does on any palblic official. The senti-
ments it expresses are debatable. We favor letting the debate
continue.
I?.
157. See supm notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
158. 881 F.2d at 1434-35.
159. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc-, 676 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Minn. 1988),
aff'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
160. Qf Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 169-72 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the passing of 16 years is "sufficient
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guin was not the public's right to information, but the need to
maintain public debate and to keep the public forum open to
participants such as Matthiessen.
Although hazy at best, the Viking Penguin court's use of
the neutral reportage privilege suggests that not only the infor-
mational theory, but also the robust, wide open debate theory
undergirds its neutral reportage analysis. Thus, the court prof-
fered a justification for the privilege that earlier courts and
commentators failed to consider?- The Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning, combined with the reasoning of courts that previously
applied the privilege, suggests that the neutral reportage privi-
lege can be expanded beyond the Viking Penguin court's
extension.
B. THE EXPANDED NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE
Courts should adopt a neutral reportage privilege whose
contours are shaped by both the informational and robust, wide
open debate theories. Because the theories work in concert to
justify applying the privilege to many situations, 62 the ex-
panded neutral reportage privilege will be broader than that
which Edwards, its progeny, and Viking Penguin have
* advanced.163
The expanded privilege should allow a republisher to re-
peat defamatory falsehoods whenever they relate to a matter of
public concern. 6 4 M will or even lack of neutrality should not
to erase whatever public-figure attributes petitioner once may have
possessed").
16L See, ag., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.),
cert denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Barry
v. Time, Inc, 584 F. Supp. 1110 (ND). Cal. 1984); P-RSMoLLA, supra note 24;
Sowle, supra note 33.
162. Although the informational and robust, wide open debate theories are
distinct conceptually, see supra notes 43-45, 64-66 and accompanying text, they
have at their core the premise that public debate furthers the public good.
With such a common core, they work well in tandem, for the end of one
equally serves the end of the other. For example, a well informed public is
better able and more likely to participate in public debate while, on the other
hand, public debate informs the public.
163. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text (setting forth the Ed-
wards privilege and the general requirements of the privilege).
164. Although such a broad neutral privilege presents the republisher a
broad avenue for abuse, the risk of abuse, and .even abuse itself, cannot over-
ride the first amendment values served by the privilege. See Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967); cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256 (1974) ("[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal,
but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated").
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remove the protections of the privilege. Moreover, the status of
both the accused and accuser should be irrelevant. Courts
should deny the privilege, however, when the republisher
ceases merely to report the falsehoods and adopts them as its
own statements.
Courts should determine as a matter of law whether the
republished defamatory falsehoods relate to a matter of public
concern. If the court determines the falsehoods relate to such a
matter, the burden should shift to the plaintiff to show that the
republisher adopted the falsehoods as its own statements.
1. Matter of Public Concern
When a matter of public concern arises, the public has a
right to know all the information related to the matter.165 The
republisher plays a vital role as a source of such information.66
165. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126-27; c. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881
F.2d 1426, 1446 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the public is injured each time
a book is pulled off a shelf or an idea is not circulated because it is arguably
libelous), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). The neutral reportage privilege
frees the republisher to report statements that the republisher otherwise
would suppress because the republisher seriously doubts that the statements
are true. If the republisher's doubts are unfounded, the public has been de-
nied valuable information. If the republisher can report the statements de-
spite its doubts, as provided by the neutral reportage privilege, the public will
receive more information. In this sense, the neutral reportage privilege serves
a function of constitutional magnitude. Cf. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (Constitution requires the Court to place
burden of proving falsity of statement at issue on plaintiff to free publisher to
print speech about matter of public concern that is "unknowably true or
false"). Even though the neutral reportage privilege also will free the repub-
lisher to report statements when its doubts were well-founded, first amend-
ment protection still is warranted. See i&; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 732 (1968).
166. 881 F.2d at 1447. Commentators have noted that the informational
theory may not be of constitutional dimension and thus may not warrant spe-
cial treatment for speech that informs. E.g., Sowle, suprm note 33, at 532.33.
Although the Court has not emphasized the informational theory, it has ac-
knowledged that an informed public is indispensable to free debate. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting Sweeney v. Pat-
terson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). Moreover, the Court has recognized
the public's right to information in other contexts. See Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62, 567 (1980) (commer-
cial speech); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39
(1978) (criminal penalties for divulging confidential information); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (commercial speech); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 495 (1975) (invasion of privacy). Thus, when a matter of public concern
arises, both the robust, wide open debate and the informational theories coun-
sel that the public be fully informed.
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Moreover, the public needs the information to participate
meaningfully in debate on the issue. The Viking Penguin
court recognized the public's need to access information by stat-
ing that when controversies arise, the Constitution requires
more speech, not less.'
In addition, the republisher itself may wish to participate
in a debate.168 The republisher's commentary will be meaning-
less if it cannot report fully the particulars of the matters that
form the basis of its commentary. The Viking Penguin court
understood this notion, for it noted that to report controversies,
republishers must be allowed to repeat accusations and
counteraccusations.i 69
When a matter of public concern arises, the republisher
should be free to report any statements related to that matter.
If courts require a republisher to censor statements that it
knows are false, they will stifle debate because a public contro-
versy typically consists of attacks launched by one participant
at the other.170 Moreover, a statement still may be significant
even if falseY"-7 In fact, falsity may increase the statement's
significance.172
Commentators'73 and courts 74 have argued that the neu-
tral reportage privilege is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, I' 175 They argue
that because the Gertz Court disapproved of courts deciding
what constitutes a matter of public concern, 76 such a matter
cannot trigger first amendment protection. These commenta-
167. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1446.
168. Matthiessen was such a republisher. See supra notes 149-52 and ac-
companying text. When a republisher participates in the debate, the commen-
tar7 can be regarded as the "covered speech" that justifies allowing the
republisher to print the defamatory falsehoods which formed the basis for the
covered speech. Note, Devekping Privilege, =Pr note 100, at 866-68. The
"covered speech" plus the defamatory falsehoods constitute the "total speech"
required to allow the republisher to participate in the debate.
169. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1444.
170. See sup, note 80 and accompanying text.
171. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soe'y, 556 F,2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
172. See i.
173. See eg., Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should Be Rejected, 33 HAs-
TiNGS L.J. 1203, 1220-22 (1982).
174. See, eg., Dickey v. CBS, Inc, 583 F.2d 1221,1226 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978).
175. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
176. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (examining the Gertz rejec-
tion of the Rosenbloom matter of public concern test).
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tors and courts misinterpret Gertz. Although the Gertz Court
did reject the matter of public concern test it had advanced in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,177 the Court did not find such
matters irrelevant to first amendment analysis.178 Instead, the
Court focused on the status of the plaintiff rather than the na-
ture of the events surrounding the defamatory falsehoods-P9
Thus, the Court did not reject Rosenbloom-80 completely; it
merely shifted the focus of its first amendment analysis.
Moreover, the Court has retreated from its opinion in
Gertz, shifting its focus back to the type of speech at issue.3-8
The Court has acknowledged that although not dispositive, the
177. 403 U.S. 29 (1971); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346
(1974).
178. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45 (arguing that because limited-purpose
public figures attain such status by thrusting themselves to the forefront of a
public controversy, they voluntarily expose themselves to the increased risk of
defamation; discussing generally the public's legitimate interest in those
classed as public figures); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greemnoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1985) (arguing that Gertz did not render the type
of speech at issue irrelevant). The Court argued that when a private individ-
ual was defamed, the state's interest in protecting the individual's reputation
may outweigh first amendment concerns, even if the defamatory falsehoods
were related to a matter of public concern. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
179. Whether a defamatory falsehood relates to a matter of public concern
always has been at the core of the Court's first amendment analysis. See, ag.,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 85 (1966). In addition, the Court must examine the context in which
the defamatory falsehoods were made when it determines the status of a pri-
vate individual plaintiff. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (discussing how an individ-
ual becomes a public figure). When a private individual attempts to influence
the outcome of a public controversy, the Court provides the protection of the
actual malice standard to those publishers who report or comment on that in-
dividual's behavior. See id. Therefore, if a matter of public concern surrounds
the events at issue, the Court must distinguish between the individual who ac-
tively participates to influence the outcome of the matter and the individual
who becomes involved passively. See ic. The Court will accord the former in-
dividual the status of limited purpose public figure" and will accord the latter
the status of "private individual." The former individual will face the protec-
tion of the actual malice standard while the latter will face whatever standard
the state court follows. See ic& at 345, 347-48. If a matter of public concern
does not exist, the Court has no reason to distinguish between the two private
individual plaintiffs. In short, even under Gertz, the Court must determine
whether the defamatory falsehoods relate to a matter of public concern.
180. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See supra notes
70-71 and accompanying text.
181. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
(1985), the Court inquired whether the speech at issue related to a matter of
public concern. Id. at 761-63. In fact, the inquiry was central to the Court's
analysis. See id. at 757-61. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767 (1986), the Court accorded equal weight to the type of speech at issue and
to the plaintiff's status. Id. at 775.
FIRS2 MNDM ENT
type of speech at issue plays an important role when the Court
assesses the first amendment interests at stake. 82
In addition, intrinsic to the robust, wide open debate theory
is the notion that speech about matters of public concern lies at
the heart of the first amendment.' a The Court has recognized
this notion repeatedly.'14 In short, inquiry into the type of
speech at issue is consistent with existing first amendment libel
law.
In constructing a framework to determine whether a mat-
ter is of public concern, courts should draw on both the rich
common law heritage85 and Supreme Court decisions.186 At a
mnimum, courts should find that matters concerning "the gov-
erning of the nation!"87 or affecting public policy1 w are of pub-
lic concern. To ensure that such a valuable right as freedom of
speech is protected, courts must be given, and must exercise,
the discretion to expand the definition further. 8 9
182. See su.pra note 181 and accompanying text; see also Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (inquiring into the nature
of the speech at issue in striking down a statute that made it a crime to divulge
certain information).
183. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269-70 (1964).
184. See, ag., Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 775-78; Dun & Brad-
street, 472 U.S. at 755-57; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
185. See, ag., Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 294-97, 126 S.E.2d 67, 77-78
(1962); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 229-30, 203 N.W. 974,
975 (1925); McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 399-400, 175 N.W. 878, 880-81
(1920); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 718-42, 98 P. 281, 283-92 (1908).
186. Se e g., Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 775; Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 761-63; Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 839. An elaborate
discussion of what constitutes a matter of public concern is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For a seminal discussion of what constitutes such a matter,
see Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rv. 193, 21416
(1890). See also General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 107-11, 340
A.2d 767, 777-79 (1975) (examining what constitutes a matter of public con.
cern); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748-51 (Fla. 1972) (same); Devel-
opments in Defamation, supra, note 29, at 925-27 (same); Note, Fair Comment,
62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1207-11 (1949) (same).
187. Meiklejobn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245, 256. This speech includes any speech critical of official conduct. See Gar-
rison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,77 (1964).
188. Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered. Time to Return to
'Thew Central Meaning of the irst Amendmen4 " 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 624
(1983). Public policy encompasses any area in which a decision may affect the
general welfare of the public. See icE
189. Q. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (arguing that judges should be given discretion to protect free
speech values), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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2. Adoption of the Defamatory Falsehood
If a republisher adopts a defamatory falsehood, it should
lose the first amendment protection of the neutral reportage
privilege. Because the privilege requires courts to ignore the
legal fiction that a republisher of a defamatory falsehood adopts
the falsehood as its own, fairness dictates that the republisher,
in fact, does not adopt the falsehood.19°
Although this proposition seems obvious, courts may find it
difficult to determine whether a republisher has adopted a de-
famatory falsehood. When courts make such determinations,
they should consider whether the republisher accurately re-
ported the statements, indicated that the statements are allega-
tions, and published the accused's denials or explanation.
Courts also should consider the republisher's motive.
When a republisher prints a defamatory falsehood, courts
should require substantial, rather than literal, accuracy.19' Be-
cause the republisher provides information and commentary in
a condensed form, literal accuracy would unduly burden a re-
publisher faced with the task of reporting voluminous and com-
plicated matters of public concern.' 92 Substantial accuracy,
however, allows a republisher to perform such a task while en-
suring that the public receives the substance of the matters at
issue.193 A workable test for substantial accuracy asks whether
the statements as republished would have the same effect on
the reader's mind as the statements that were published or ut-
tered originally.'9
190. Sowle, supra note 33, at 543; Note, Protecting the Public Debate: A
Proposed Constitutional Privilege of Accurate Republication, 58 TEx. L. REV.
623, 644 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Accurate Republication].
191. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.),
cer denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434 US. 1002 (1977);
Sowle, supra note 33, at 533.
192. See Cafferty v. Southern Tier Publishing Co., 226 N.Y. 87, 93, 123 NE.
76, 78 (1919) (discussing libel law as a system of reasonable regulations, not a
system of technicalities); see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
491 (1975) (public relies on press to provide news and information "in conve-
nient form"). A requirement of literal accuracy also would offend the first
amendment concerns advanced in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974). In that case, the Court warned against the chilling
effect created by intrusions into the editorial process. Id.
193. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120; Comment, Cianci, supra note 94, at 1517;
Note, Accurate Republication, supra note 190, at 644. An inaccurate report is
of no value to the public. Note, Accurate Republication, supra note 190, at 644;
Note, Developing Privilege, supra note 100, at 873.
194. Cafferty, 226 N.Y. at 93,123 N.E. at 78; see McCormick v. Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co., 139 So. 2d 197, 200 (FIn. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Brown v.
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Courts should not require a republisher to attribute a state-
ment directly to its source.;95 Nor should courts require a re-
publisher to balance its report or commentary with the
accused's denials or explanations.L96 The Supreme Court has
declared similar intrusions into the editorial process unconsti-
tutional because they chill speech by causing self-censorship97
The Court's reasoning applies equally well in the neutral re-
portage context.' s A republisher will be reluctant to supply
information or comment on debate if a jury will be allowed to
second guess the republisher's editorial decisions.199 When a
republisher does elect to reveal sources or print the accused's
response, however, the factfinder should weigh this factor
heavily in favor of finding no adoption. Both the Edwards and
Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 636,112 S.W. 462, 468 (1908). in determining
whether the republisher has met the test, courts should consider the difficulty
of the reporting task. Sowle, supra note 33, at 538.
195. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 147 (3d Cir.), cerf died, 454
U.S. 836 (1981); rf C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, supm note 150 (investiga-
tive reporting which ignited the public debate about Watergate). An investiga-
tive reporter often cannot reveal her sources for fear of her life or the lives of
her sources.
196. See Comment, Constitutional Priviee, supra note 100, at 1281-84; f
C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, supm note 150 (investigative reporting which
ignited the public debate about Watergate). An investigative reporter often
cannot obtain the accused's comments because to do so may endanger both the
reporter and her sources. Moreover, such an endeavor may inhibit the re-
porter's investigation because the accused may cover its tracks.
197. The Supreme Court has held that a state cannot require a publisher to
provide a right of reply to persons attacked in its publication. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Court reasoned that
such a requirement constituted an impermissible intrusion into editorial dis-
cretion. See id at 256. The reasoning rested on the notion that "[g]overnment-
enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate."' Id. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964)); see also i- at 261 (White, J., concurring) (stating that
'"tis law runs afoul of the elementary First Amendment proposition that gov-
ernment may not force a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic dis-
cretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom floor").
198. Although requiring a publisher to present a story in a cert manner
to invoke a privilege differs fundamentally from requiring the publisher to
provide right of access to avoid a criminal penalty, the notion that the right of
access chill free speech applies equally to a requirement of neutrality. Both
require the publisher to behave in a certain manner, regardless of his bestjudgment; or suffer a penalty, in the case of the neutrality rduirement the
penalty takes the form of denying the publisher the privilege's protection.
This consideration in turn chills speech and inhibits public debate, for the pub-
lisher will not run a story when the publisher cannot present the other side of
the story, when the story criticizes, or when the publisher feels that including
the other side detracts from the story as a whole.
199. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
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Vikcing Penguin courts recognized this proposition.m
A republisher, nevertheless, should be required to indicate
that allegations are merely allegations.' If a republisher fails
to do so, the public may assume not only that the republisher
believes that the allegations are true but also that the repub-
lisher made the allegations. Liability should follow in such a
case because the republisher should not be allowed to misin-
form the public or comment on debate which it has deliberately
distorted.202
A republisher's ill will or improper motive should not itself
remove the first amendment protection of the neutral report-
age privilege.203 Such a finding, however, is evidence that the
republisher adopted the defamatory falsehood. The republisher
can rebut this evidence if it can show that, regardless of its mo-
tive, it republished the defamatory falsehoods in a fair and ac-
curate fashion.2°"
Courts cannot impose liability for speech of constitutional
dimension if they merely determine that the speaker acted out
of hatred, spite, or ill will. 05 Similarly, in the neutral report-
200. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1444-45 (8th Cir. (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556
F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co.,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
201. Comment, Constitutional Priviege, supra note 100, at 1283. Such an
intrusion into the editorial process is minimal. Id. Moreover, the requirement
is objective. It is not subject to the review of a jury. As such, it does not sub-
ject the republisher to potential liability because a jury does not like the re-
publisher's speech. See in ra notes 206.07 and accompanying text (exploring
the danger of the jury to the republisher).
202. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1434; Edwards, 556 F.?d at 120.
203. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1964); Sowle, supra note 33,
at 541-43; Note, Constitutional Privilege, s-upr note 100, at 1279; Comment,
Cianc,, supr note 94, at 1522-24; Note, Accurate Republication, supra note
190, at 639-40.
204. f Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1444-45 (noting that republisher of
damaging attack gave accused chance to respond); Sowle, supmta note 33, at 541-
43 (arguing that fairness and accuracy should defeat ill will). The Viking Pen.
gun court recognized that courts should only focus on the particular state-
ments at issue and ignore the overall tone of the report. Id. at 1434. Such a
narrow focus insures not only that the public receives a wide range of informa-
tion, Comment, Cianci, supra note 94, at 1522-24, but also that a wide range of
participants can participate in public debate, q. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at
1444-45 (arguing that reporters must be allowed to repeat allegations to write
about controversies).
205. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970).
Debate on public issues will be chilled if the speaker knows that the accused
can hale her into court and establish liability by simply showing that she
spoke out of hatred. Id,
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age context, courts should allow a republisher to comment on
defamatory falsehoods without fear of liability. If a jury can
impose liability on a finding of ill will, the jury may reduce the
range of information and commentary available to the public,2°6
as well as deny republishers the opportunity to participate in
public debate. °
The factfinder should consider the above factors to deter-
mine when a republisher has crossed the line from merely re-
porting to adopting defamatory falsehoods.08  Once a
republisher has crossed that line, courts should hold the repub-
lisher liable.
3. Scope
The twin theories underlying the expanded neutral report-
age privilege?09 should define its scope. The public will desire
information whenever a matter of public concern arises, and re-
publishers will want to comment on such matters. Thus, the
privilege should apply whenever a matter of public concern
arises.
Both the robust, wide open debate and informational theo-
ries justify such a broad privilege when the original publisher
directs allegations at a public official or public figure. If the re-
publisher informs the public of such allegations, the public can
urge investigation or comment itself on the subject's behav-
ior.210 Even if the republisher knows that the allegations are
false, it should retain the freedom to print the allegations so
that it may comment on them.2 " Moreover, the public needs
information about the entire matter to formulate its opinion
and comments2 12
206. See Comment, Cianci, suru note 94, at 1522-24.
207. Cf. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426,144445 (8th Cir. 1989)
(arguing that reporters must be allowed to repeat allegations to write about
controversies), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
208. For example, suppose a republisher publishes a harsh attack on an in-
dlividual In its attack, it republishes defamatory falsehoods and mentions that
they are only allegations. The republisher has information that would allevi-
ate the harshness of the allegations but withholds the information because it
desires maximum impact. In this situation, the factfinder should find adoption
and hence liability.
209. The informational theory and the robust, wide open debate theory.
See supra notes 43-45, 64-66 and accompanying text.
210. See Comment, Cianci, supm note 94, at 1512-13.
211. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d at 1444.
212. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See supra notes 165-67
and accompanying text; see also Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127
1990]
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Both the robust, wide open debate and informational theo-
ries also justify the republication of allegations made by a pub-
lic official or public figure. Such statements are. a matter of
public concern at their mere utterance. 13 The public has an in-
terest in the allegations because they reflect the credibility and
judgment of those whose decisions affect their lives.214 Simi-
larly, both the republisher and the public have an interest in
commenting on the allegations. In addition, the nature of the
positions occupied by public officials and public figures allows
them unique access to the media to defend themselves.' 5
Moreover, public officials and public figures must accept the
consequences of their positions, withstanding greater public
scrutiny in the interest of maintaining robust, wide open
debate.216
When a private individual directs allegations at another
private individual but the allegations relate to a matter of pub-
lie concern, a republisher should be allowed to inform the pub-
lic of all speech surrounding the matter: The public has an
interest in receiving complete information because such infor-
mation allows the public, rather than the courts, to be the ulti-
mate judge of the matter21P 7 Moreover, courts should allow
republishers to repeat the allegations so that the republishers
can comment on them.218 Having absorbed the republisher's
commentary, the public can comment on the allegations or the
republisher's opinion. Thus, republication perpetuates the
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (arguing that the public, not the press, should assess credibil-
ity of sources and their accusations).
213. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert
denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
214. Sowle, supra note 33, at 529-30. Today, public figures play a actiVe and
significant role in decisionmaking. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
215. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
216. I& at 344-45. The nature of the remedy provided by a libel judgment
indicates that the best arena for redress is not the courts, but the arena of pub-
lic debate. A libel judgment comes in the form of money damages and typi-
cally comes years after the injury to reputation. Because The injury to the
public official or figure is swift, the judgment can hardly be said to compensate
the injury, but takes on the character of punishment which in turn results in
deterrence. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring) (characterizing libel actions brought against public offi-
cials as a "technique for harassing and punishing a free press"). Such a result
chills speech and inhibits robust, wide open debate. The better remedy is
forceful, confident entry into the public debate.
217. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Contr
Comment, Cianci, supra note 94, at 1513 n.115.




This analysis may seem to treat the reputational interests
of the private individual lightly. It does so only because it fo-
cuses on the need to encourage public debate and disseminate
information regarding matters of public concern to the public.
These activities are at the heart of the first amendment.22
Consequently, the private individual's reputational interest is
subordinated to weightier constitutional interests. Three fac-
tors, however, alleviate the potential harshness of such a rule.
First, the neutral reportage privilege in no way affects the abil-
ity of the individual defamed to pursue a defamation action
against the original publisher. The privilege protects only the
republisher. Although the republisher significantly magnifies
the potential for harm by republishing the allegations, the orig-
inal publisher will be liable for the full extent of any reason-
ably foreseeable harm.2  In addition, because the private
individual usually suffers the most harmful consequences of a
defamatory falsehood in the immediate community, a jury ver-
dict in her favor will counteract the falsehood's effect in the
community, for news of such a verdict is capable of being
spread throughout the immediate community.
Second, the requirement that the republisher disclose that
an allegation is only an allegationF cushions the blow of any
219. If a matter of public concern does not exist before a private individual
directs allegations at a private individual, courts should deny the republisher
the first amendment protection of the neutral reportage privilege. Without
such a pre-existing matter, the justifications break down. The public has no
pre-existing interest. Nor does the republisher have any reason to comment
When a public official is involved, however, courts should not require a pre-
existing controversy because the public's interest in the conduct of the public
official is pre-existing, as is the need for comment Edwards v. National Audu-
bon Soc'y, 5M F2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New
York Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
220. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92, 495 (1975) (set-
ting forth need for information); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-71 (setting
forth need for public debate); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945) (setting forth need for information). The Court places special emphasis
on the need for public dissemination of commentary on matters of public con-
cern: '"Ihe dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of public in-
terest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of Independence, an
'unalienable right' that 'governments are instituted among men to secure.'
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967).
221. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 4.13[21; RESTATE~mNT (SECOND), supra
note 24, § 576 comment d; see W. KEEroN, supma note 24, § 113, at 803. More-
over, fairness dictates that the original defamer bear the consequences of its
act. Comment, Accurate Republication, supra note 190, at 641-42.
222. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
indicate allegations).
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defamatory falsehoods, for the reader will realize that the re-
published statements are debatable.; -3 Thus, any imputations
of fact will be left to the reader. In this sense, the republisher
does not magnify the injury because the reader judges the truth
of the allegations for herself. 24
Finally, the requirement that the allegations relate to a
matter of public concern will ensure that the republisher in-
vokes the neutral reportage privilege only when its protection
truly is warranted. Thus, the allegations will be republished
for a purpose other than to injure the private individual.P
The matter of public concern requirement also will mini-
mize opportunities for republishers to republish defamatory
falsehoods directed at private individuals. A private individual
rarely will become embroiled in a matter of public concern un-
less she injects herself into that matter.226 When a private indi-
vidual does become embroiled passively, she probably will be
the center of the matter. 27 In this situation, the interests of
the private individual must be subordinated to those of the gen-
eral public. If the individual's interests are not subordinated,
the republisher can report only a distorted version of the mat-
ter and may not be able to report the matter at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Viking Penguin court considered whether and how to
protect a republisher of allegedly defamatory falsehoods. The
223. Comment, Constitutio=1 Prvilege, supra note 100, at 1283. The
Court has argued that the public is capable of making similar judgments.
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (public is ca-
pable of understanding that because of context in which publisher used the
word "blackmail," publisher did not accuse plaintiff of committing a criminal
offense).
224. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Because
the media will be interested in a matter of public concern regardless of the
"public" or 'private" status of the defamed individual, the defamed "Private"
individual should enjoy access to the media to defend herself similar to the ac-
cess enjoyed by public officials and public figures. Thus, the reader will be ex-
posed to rebuttal of the allegations.
225. Comment, Cianc, supm note 94, at 1515-17.
226. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967). there
are of course exceptions to this proposition. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40
(1971).
227. See, e-g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; Rosenblom, 403 U.S. at 43, 48. In this
situation the private individual often approaches the status of a limited pur-
pose public figure. E.g., Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 154-55. But see, eg.,
Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157,165-69 (1979); Gertz, 418 U.S. at
352; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 40.
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court seized the opportunity to provide republishers the first
amendment protection afforded by the neutral reportage privi-
lege. Because the falsehoods at issue arose in the context of in-
vestigative reporting, the court incorporated the robust, wide
open debate theory adopted in New York Times Co. v. Sulivan.
Previously, courts and commentators had justified the neutral
reportage privilege with the theory that the privilege allowed
the public to obtain information about public controversies.
The Viking Penguin courts use of the privilege suggests a jus-
tification for the neutral reportage privilege that not only
strengthens the privilege's doctrinal validity but also broadens
its scope.
If courts use both the informational theory and the robust,
wide open debate theory to undergird the neutral reportage
privilege, the privilege applies to the reporting of any matter of
public concern. To invoke the privilege, a republisher must en-
sure that the republished statements relate to a matter of pub-
lic concern. Further, the republisher must not adopt those
statements. In spite of the conditions, the neutral reportage
privilege affords the republisher much needed protection to re-
port and comment on matters of public concern.
Courts should adopt a wide ranging neutral reportage privi-
lege. The privilege will allow matters of public concern to be
both fully reported and fully debated. Such debate is indispen-
sable if the values underlying the first amendment are to be
realized.
Mark W. Page
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